Assurance case development is not a trivial process. It involves several steps, firstly, to define the right goals and context, then to develop convincing line of reasoning and to collect valid supporting evidence. Many issues of unconvincing or bad structured argument, unsupported claims, incomplete or outdated evidence have to be resolved to produce a strong […]
NOR-STA support three assurance case model including GSN. The implementation of Core GSN as defined in GSN Community Standard version 3.0 was now complete. In NOR-STA version 7.9 released yesterday we delivered implementation of the last missing types of relations. Now you can in your argument in NOR-STA: define claims supported directly by other claims, […]
In current practice, assurance cases are being developed and assessed mostly manually. Automating these processes have a potential of saving time and money, as well as improving consistency between assurance cases and the related systems. The questions arise what can and what should be automated in argument development, evidence management, argument reviews and change management […]
Assurance cases developed according with GSN Community Standard version 3 and also with ISO 15026-2 standard is now possible in NOR-STA version 7.8. Both standards are widely used however there are differences in their definitions of the argument structure and the naming conventions are different.The new version also adds assurance case editing functions in the […]
Security Protection Profiles specify security requirements that apply to a specific component and which need to be verified. Protection Profiles are used for IACS components to demonstrate satisfaction of requirements of IEC 62443 and also for medical devices and IEC TR 60601-4-5.During the meeting we will investigate the possibility of defining a Protection Profile for […]
Assumptions play an important role in assurance cases and they should be properly managed to ensure trustworthy argumentation. On our March meeting we have discussed the main roles the assumptions can play in the argument. On our next meeting we will discuss assumptions management and present demonstrators in NOR-STA. We will focus on the three […]
When developing system assurance cases, we often use assumptions and they play different roles. They can provide context for our argument or assumptions that other modules should fulfill. Assumptions can also address weaknesses in an argument (defeaters) or be used as part of a confidence argument.We invite for the next NOR-STA User Group meeting on […]